1.2 Theory of governance

Governance first and foremost takes the form of a conceptual framework that attempts to give meaning to practices that more traditional liberal or critical approaches no longer seem able to make intelligible (Hirst, 2000: 85). Such approaches continue to take for granted the classical division between the State and civil society, whereas in practice the distinction is not so rigid.

Peters (2000) speaks of old and new governance to illustrate the difference between a traditionally statist and centralizing approach and one based on coordination and the role of networks in the organization of power. In the latter case, power is no longer the monopoly of the all-powerful State, which appears rather as one partner among many (Pierre, 2000: 3). In other words, to quote David Cameron and Richard Simeon, "neither citizenship nor governance is contained any longer within the boundaries of the state, nor are states the only loci of political decision making" (Cameron and Simeon, 2001: 60).

According to Gerry Stoker, "governance networks seek ... not only to influence government, but also to take its place" (Stoker, 1998: 26) [our translation]. Such networks might in the future be more capable than government of promoting the collective interest and solving contemporary social problems.

For most commentators, the issue of responsibility makes it necessary for the State to retain a role. According to Peters, governance requires the existence of a method of public accountability so that the decisions taken are legitimate: "the removal of government from the process ... appears to remove any real possibility for public accountability" (Peters, 2001: 48).

The network is, by its nature, inward looking and focused on its own interests. It may, for example, seek to limit freedom of expression or dissent or turn itself into a kind of clan operating by exclusion (Belley, 2001). Under such conditions, the State, without taking over the network, must work to orient its action so as not to lose sight of the broader public interest.

In addition, the new governance involves a study of the procedures used to achieve a new form of organized power and collective action (Stoker, 1998: 19). It has a normative ambition that involves giving new meaning to the very idea of government (Cardinal and Andrew, 2001: 4). Among other things, it takes the form of a changing model of organization based on the principles of interdependence, negotiation and coordination (Peters, 2000; Stoker, 1998). Its chief characteristic is subsidiarity, whose objective is to bring the solution of problems as close to citizens as possible (Paquet, 2000: 2).

According to Luc Juillet, Gilles Paquet and Francesca Scala (2001: 3):

• in the present context, the concept of governance can prove subversive - it calls in question the popular assumption that it is not only possible but even desirable for one person or group to have what is required to govern alone. The contemporary approach to governance assumes that collaboration is normally indispensable [our translation].

In other words, when governments now call upon a multiplicity of players, there arises the challenge of effective coordination of action based on collaboration and on new forms of collective accountability.

Stoker has proposed a frame of reference and principles of organization to better account for the development of the new governance (Stoker, 1998: 20). His observations are organized into five propositions, as follows:

• governance involves the action of a set of institutions and players not all of whom belong to the sphere of government";
  
• "in a situation of governance, boundaries and responsibilities are less clear with respect to social and economic action";
  
• "governance shows interdependence between the powers of the institutions involved in collective action";
  
• "governance involves the action of networks of independent players";
  
• "governance starts from the principle that it is possible to act without surrendering to the power or authority of the State. The State's role is to use new techniques and tools to orient and guide collective action" (Stoker, 1998: 20-21) [our translation].

1.3 Governance and coordination of action

From a review of writings on governance, we have identified four conditions under which the horizontal coordination of action may prove effective.

The first condition of effectiveness has to do with the method of accountability that will apply to the coordination of action. According to Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintzman, accountability is a "cornerstone of public governance and management because it requires that those who hold and exercise public authority be held to account" (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2001: 244).

Accountability has three objectives: i) "to control for the abuse and misuse of public authority"; ii) "to provide assurance in respect to the effective use of public resources, respect for the law and adherence to public service values"; iii) "to encourage and promote learning in pursuit of continuous improvement in government and public management" (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2001: 244-45).

The definition of new methods of collective accountability is a major issue of horizontal governance. According to Aucoin and Heintzman, the changes in methods of governance require awareness that "authority and accountability are no longer concentrated at the top of the hierarchy" (p. 246). The interorganizational dimensions of partnerships among government and non-government players require the putting in place of new forms of collective accountability. Coordination of action will be more or less effective depending on the presence or absence of these methods.

The second condition of effectiveness consists in a better understanding of the division of responsibilities between civil society and the State. The State cannot completely dissociate itself from civil society, although it is called upon to take on new responsibilities. Effective coordination of action is possible when the various players recognize this state of affairs and the fact that having civil society take responsibility for itself is not the same thing as leaving a society to itself.

The third condition of effectiveness rests on the possibility of ongoing interaction among the players, based on collective learning resulting from the pooling of knowledge and expertise. To this end, the partnership must be based on a joint project or rules common to all. Otherwise, the coordination of action threatens to give rise to tensions and conflicts of interest among the players rather than ongoing interaction and collective learning.

The fourth condition of effectiveness consists in the State’s capacity to serve as a catalyst to support the action of the networks of independent players. To this end, the integration of networks of players must be avoided; such integration would lead to the introduction of more cumbersome operating structures. Effective coordination of action must serve to support and ensure the openness of networks; otherwise, the action will further burden an already heavy government bureaucracy instead of promoting the development of partnerships and subsidiarity.

These conditions for the effective coordination of action depend on a series of factors that are difficult to control. The most important of these factors is that, in Canada, the organizational culture of government is characterized by a system of vertical accountability. This is more conducive to centralization and bureaucratization than a system of horizontal governance would be.

According to Stoker, it must also be accepted that governance may prove a failure. Conflicts of interest, faults in the system, tensions among the players, in short, realpolitik, are all factors that may make distributed, horizontal governance based on learning by the players and coordination or ongoing interaction among them impossible. In addition, horizontal governance is not a guarantee of success in the current process of redefining public institutions. It might even contribute to limiting the capacity of groups to intervene in the political process if they are relegated to managerial and coordinating activities and if the State disengages itself from them.

According to Jan Kooiman, emphasis must be placed on interaction among the players and the recognition and acceptance of a multiplicity of methods of governance. The players must accept a meta-principle or shared values based on openness to difference, communication and learning if they are to cope with the complexity of the processes involved, their diversity and their dynamism (Kooiman, 2000: 162). This is quite a tall order and shows that governance is more than a set of procedures or a renewal of corporatism. It aims at a new organization of power and of collective action. The governance of a society is effective when power, knowledge and resources are well distributed.

1.4 Governance and official language minorities

In 1996, the Commissioner of Official Languages’ exhaustive study on the implementation by the federal government of Part VII, A Blueprint for Action, constituted an important starting point for reflection on the governance of the official language minorities in Canada. The study analyzed how the federal government of the time was taking into account the issue of the vitality and development of the official language minorities in federal institutions subject to the Act (Commissioner of Official Languages, 1996).

The purpose of the study was to encourage respect for the objectives of Part VII. It expressed the hope that "decision makers at all levels in the Government of Canada [would] be personally committed, and be more creative in identifying opportunities to achieve Part VII objectives" (Commissioner of Official Languages, 1996: 73). At the time, Part VII was just beginning to be implemented. In 1998, the Savoie report showed that Part VII was still the object of much misunderstanding on the part of decision makers and public servants.

Concomitantly, other studies showed that the introduction of new horizontal methods of governance such as devolution or the privatization of public services had significant consequences for the official language minorities. According to many, the government transformations led to a loss of rights in the area of official languages (Commissioner of Official Languages, 1998, 2001; Fontaine, 1999; Savoie, 1998).

Finally, the continuing judiciarization of the issue of language in Canada adds to the challenges of governance. As the Commissioner of Official Languages wrote, "the investigation mechanisms and the threat of court remedy seem to have fostered some resistance, which must be broken down by a change in the culture of federal institutions with regard to linguistic duality" (Commissioner of Official Languages, 2000: 100). She believes, moreover, that "there have been enough court decisions to clarify the scope of language rights and that it is now time for concrete political and administrative accountability" (p. 8).

Like the Commissioner of Official Languages, in recent years many others have asked the federal government to give major impetus to the official languages in Canada and to better fulfil its obligations in this area. Some have also suggested that it step back to gain a better perspective on what must be done with respect to the vitality and development of the official language minorities (Savoie, 1998: 53).

For their part, the spokespersons for the official language minorities, outside Quebec in particular, demanded a comprehensive development policy. They continually called for a more integrated approach and greater coherence from the federal government with respect to the vitality and development of the official language minorities. They also asked to be better integrated into the language planning process.

The data available on linguistic minorities in Europe show that the transformations in the organization of power in countries such as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have raised many hopes (Loughlin, 1999). In Canada, it must be said that the official language minorities are more fearful. Here, governance is often associated with a loss of rights.